






**(DFID Arranged) Donor Brief
Shelter/NFI/CCCM Briefing
OCHA Meeting Room, Yangon
8th March 2016 (10.00-12.00am)**

Attendees: WaSH, USAID, DFID, SDC, NRC, DRC, Canada, UNHCR, Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster, LWF, SI, SCI & OCHA

Agenda & Discussion	Presentation
<p>Self-introductions made. Chairperson (DFID) offered overview of the meeting agenda.</p> <p>Presentation given by the National Cluster Coordinator (NCC). NCC expressed gratitude to the range of actors present, not least DFID for arranging.</p> <p><u>Temporary shelters in Rakhine State (RS):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 2012: Following <i>two</i> waves of violence, emergency shelter was provided. After 6+ months, over 100,000 IDPs were located in tents and/or under plastic sheeting on highly flood prone land (<i>see images top row</i>). ➤ 2013: The collective view of the international community was that shelter had to be improved based on a humanitarian imperative. Temporary shelters were funded and built – 45% to 50% by Rakhine State Government (RSG) and 50% by the international community (<i>see images centre row</i>). ➤ 2016: Temporary shelters have exceeded their lifespan. See images bottom row. 	   <p> Myanmar Shelter Cluster ShelterCluster.org Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter</p> <p> CCCM CLUSTER SUPPORTING DISPLACED COMMUNITIES www.cccmcluster.org</p>

Temporary shelter 2016 needs:

NCC stressed the urgency of support for funding *before* the monsoon/cyclone season. **Imperative to operate at scale and speed.**

- 2014: 42% of *all* 2, 843 temporary shelters received care & maintenance.
- 2015: 40% of all 2,400 temporary shelters received care & maintenance. 400+ were decommissioned due to individual housing solutions.
- 2016: Last few weeks assessments have been undertaken by Shelter Cluster Lead (UNHCR), OCHA, NRC, LWF, DRC and critically Rakhine State Government. Long houses visited unit by unit, making categorisation in terms of needs: full rehabilitation, major repair or minor repair.
 - Needs clearly *more* severe in Pauktaw T/ship in terms of condition of shelters due to more extreme situation in camps.
 - Assessment *being* done in Kyein Ni Pyin today and Meybon to be done tomorrow.
 - Needs are being focused on the three key T/ships and will not include Maungdaw, Kyauk Phyu, Ramree and Rathedaung, which combined contain the remaining 6% of *all* IDPs in Rakhine State.

Temporary Shelter Needs

2013 RESPONSE

2,843 (8-unit) temporary shelters built

2014 RESPONSE

1,183 (8-unit) essential repair & maintenance (42%)


2015 RESPONSE

962 (8-unit) essential repair & maintenance (40%)
400+ (8-unit) *decommissioned*

2016 NEEDS

1,385 (8-unit) in SITTWE T/ship need some work
4% need full rehabilitation
81% need major repair
15% need minor repair

183 (8-unit) in PAUKTAW T/ship (NC & ANY) need some work (exclude. KNP & STM)
83% need full rehabilitation
16% need major repair
1% need minor repair



ASSESSMENT TEAM

OCHA, NRC, LWF, DRC, RSG (DRD & Govt. Camp Focal Points) & Cluster Lead (UNHCR)

✓ SITTWE T/ship
✓ PAUKTAW T/ship
(excluding KNP)

X MAUNGDAW T/ship
X MEYBON T/ship
X KYAUK PHYU T/ship
X RAMREE T/ship
X RATHEDAUNG T/ship

MEYBON T/ship

Total of 89 (8-unit)
10 (8-unit) – RSG
79 (8-unit) – balance?

Temporary shelter deterioration:

Built in 2013, initial temporary shelter initial life span was two years; structure was “deliberately” temporary and materials were “deliberately” degradable. NCC highlighted the exponential rate of degradation in third year of their life span.

Other reasons for current situation included:

- Impact of 2015 Cyclone Komen;
- International community reluctant to fund unsustainable encampment as opposed to solutions;
- Known unknowns, notably what are the Government plans?

Funding commitments for temporary shelter needs:

- Cluster lead (UNHCR) = US\$1.1 million;
- LWF = US\$500,000;
- RSG = TBD; new fiscal year starts in April 2016;
- Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (OCHA) = US\$300,000, half of which could be spent on shelter, other half on WaSH;
- Initial temporary shelter gap (as stated in the 2016 HRP) was US\$3.7 million;
- Based on latest assessments needs are US\$3.2;
- Therefore, **current funding gap is US\$1.5 million.**

Increasing Temporary Shelter Deterioration...

WHY?

- Temporary structures - bamboo walls/floors

Government dictates materials

- Designed to last two years


Year three increasing rate of deterioration

- 2015 Cyclone Komen
- International community reluctant to *fund encampment*
- Known unknowns




FUNDING COMMITMENTS

- Cluster Lead (UNHCR)
- LWF
- Rakhine State Government ?
- Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (OCHA)



US\$ NEEDS

- 3.7US\$ million (HRP 2016)
- 3.2US\$ million (March 2016)



CURRENT GAP

- **1.55US\$ million**

Various Stages of Temporary Shelter:

- OCHA Director of Operations, John Ging, recently visits IDP camps in RS; expressed “heartbreak to see so many children in these dreadful conditions” (see image top left).
- Depicts the chronic emergency shelter situation in same camp in March 2013 (see image top right). Taken during a high-level mission to Rakhine State/same camp: Minister for Immigration, Deputy Minister for Border Affairs, US and Australian Ambassadors and British Deputy Ambassador. Support was critical with the rainy season only weeks away and the Cluster a month old. Desperate need to move beyond emergency shelter based on a clear humanitarian imperative following the 2012 violence.
- Depicts *much* improved shelter situation in 2013 (see image bottom left).
- Depicts degrading temporary shelters in 2014 (see image bottom right).



Camp management committee (CMC) reform:

NCC stressed ongoing and *huge* challenge of camp management committees and need for reform. In 2015 deployment of donor supported CCCM Cluster Lead (who had worked extensively in the region) and brought significant improvements at the operational level still really struggled to make inroads in this area.

- “Seven” key extreme challenges were outlined. These included failure to enforce their responsibility, appointed, not representative, corrupt, no limit of tenure, impunity and blocking assistance.
- “Five” key next steps were outlined, some more immediate than others. NCC stressed *if* progress was to be made it would be a long process over many, many months and would likely have to be tackled camp by camp.

Question & Answer (Q&A):

Camp Management Committee Reform

EXTREME CHALLENGES

- Responsibility never enforced
- Government appointed/GAD
- Not representative (location/non-IDPs)
- Corrupt, extort & violent
- Impunity (no limit of tenure)
- Blocking humanitarian assistance
- Omnipresent



NEXT STEPS

- Another w/shop
- Try again to desegregate civil administration/camp coordination
- Disbanding & reforming
- Rakhine State Government requested Cluster Lead/UNHCR support
- RSG Security Minister support critical



During Q&A DFID/others:

- Noted the reluctance of the international community to fund encampment and the critical need to broaden discussion of the future of temporary shelter and dignified living conditions with the Rakhine State Government (RSG); recognized that strategic shift was most likely to take place during the *next* dry season;
- Acknowledged/supported urgency of funding for temporary shelter needs and repairs to be completed before the monsoon/cyclone season;
- Requested additional breakdown of costs (i.e. cost of full rehabilitation, major repair and minor repair) once *all* assessments complete;
- Commented that the funding gap should be set based on an assumption that the RSG may *not* support with any of the needs.